a. The Opinion of Richard of Middleton

α. Exposition of the Opinion

346. As to the first point there are some who seem to say no.

347. But we must consider if their reasons prove it. The first reason is as follows: Sin cannot be deleted from the soul unless the soul be made pure from being impure. But this cannot be done save by some change introduced into the soul. This change will necessarily be to some positive form that is repugnant to guilt, and this an absolute form, for there is no motion or change to relation, Physics 5.2.225b11-13. An absolute form of this sort repugnant to guilt I call ‘grace’;     therefore etc     .

348. The second reason: there is in sin a deformity opposed to grace as privation is opposed to habit; but a privation cannot be taken away save by the conferring of the opposite habit;     therefore etc     . And this is what Augustine argues, that guilt and grace are opposed as light and darkness in the air [Augustine, Enchiridion 3 n.11, 4 n.14].

349. The third reason: guilt can only be deleted if it is not imputed for punishment. But if its disordering remains, it is necessarily imputed for punishment, because while it remains it cannot be otherwise ordered than through infliction of punishment.     Therefore guilt cannot be dismissed unless its disordering is taken away. But it is only taken away by grace; therefore etc     .

350. The fourth reason is as follows: if guilt is dismissed, the divine offense is removed;     therefore the sinner is reconciled to God, and is consequently accepted by God; but he is not accepted without grace; therefore etc     . And there is a confirmation, because if he is not an enemy, then he is a friend.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

351. I argue against this opinion [n.346].

First as follows: all things that are repugnant to each other as to the same thing, exclude each other as to that thing. Therefore, that to which many things are repugnant as to some subject can be excluded from that subject by any one of them. But rectitude in pure natural state is repugnant to original guilt even without grace. The thing is plain as to the fact according to the Master, who posits that man was made thus by God. It is plain too by reason as to possibility, because if nature could not be made right by natural rectitude and without grace, then grace would be natural, though not to fallen nature but to nature instituted in its proper rectitude; for that is natural which is consequent to nature in itself. Therefore it follows that guilt can be removed by natural rectitude alone and without grace.

352. If it be said that rectitude could exist absolutely in nature without grace, yet after guilt it could not be restored save by the conferring of grace - against this, and at the same time in answer to the principal conclusion [n.346], I argue thus: a form that does not include in itself the being of some other nature is not otherwise inseparable from anything. For it is because a form is the sort it is and is possessed of the sort of being it has that it is     therefore separable or inseparable from anything. But a form in a subject does not include in itself the being of another nature from the fact that its opposite has preceded it in that subject (as is plain of cold and heat in water). Therefore , a form is not otherwise inseparable from anything by the fact that its opposite has preceded it in that subject. But natural rectitude, though it had not preceded its opposite, could be separated from grace according to you; therefore etc     . [n.352].That is: because natural rectitude can exist without grace (as you admit it did before the fall), it does not include the idea of grace in itself. So it is separable from grace, and it does not cease to be so separable just because its opposite (guilt) existed in its subject, namely the soul, through the fall. So natural rectitude can exist in the soul again after the fall with the same separability from grace, that is, it can exist there again without grace. ⁸

353. Again, whatever man God can create according to his absolute form, him can God also precisely repair after guilt according to his absolute form; but God can precisely create man in pure natural rectitude;     therefore etc     . The proof of the major is that guilt does not make nature to be different in itself;     therefore neither does it make it not to be capable of the same things as it was capable of before. But a divine agent can impress on nature whatever it is capable of, and that without anything that is not included in the idea of what is impressed upon, and especially if this was not included in it before the form was impressed; but grace is of this sort with respect to justice or natural rectitude; therefore etc     .

354. If objection is raised against the major that, according to Jerome, God cannot make a virgin from a non-virgin, and yet he could from the beginning have formed or created a man a virgin - my reply is: I have taken in the major [n.353] ‘any man in his absolute form’, and the objection is not relevant here, because if one takes anything absolute that is introduced by virginity, whether it be perfection in the mind or disposition in the flesh, God can repair the whole of it. But virginity states, over and above this, a certain negation of a preceding act, namely that of never having fallen in flesh or mind into a sin of the flesh; and from the fact the act happened in the past God cannot make it that it did not happen in the past. Hence the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139b8-11 commends the saying of Agathon who rightly says, “From God is taken even this alone, to now undo what is already done.” And the reason is that there can be no making of a not-being from a not-being, because (extending ‘making’ to its greatest extent), any making is of being from not-being, or of not-being from being (as in annihilation), or of being from being; but the past is a not-being and ‘it did not happen’ is another not-being; therefore from something past cannot be made that it was not past.

355. But if the objection is raised, ‘if God can restore the whole absolute that was in virginity, therefore he can give the golden crown, for the golden crown seems to correspond with some absolute perfection in virginity’ - one can say that the golden crown of virginity is an accidental joy in one’s innocence, namely of never having fallen into that sin to which nature is commonly prone, above all in adolescence.

356. And if it be objected that this negation is not of a very excellent or special joy - I reply: as the affirmation is something to flee from or hate, so is the negation something to love. Therefore, as ‘to have fallen into such sin’ is something excellent to hate so ‘never to have fallen’ is something to love from charity and to delight in. Therefore, although essential joy is about some positive good, indeed about the greatest good, it is however not unacceptable for some accidental joy to be added to it negatively afterwards. For never to have fallen into guilt adds an amount of joy beyond what one has in having risen to grace after guilt.

γ. Scotus’ own Conclusion

357. I concede, therefore, the conclusions of these last reasons [nn.351-353], that God could of his absolute power dismiss original guilt without conferring grace, and this above all because grace is not formally opposed to original sin, and because that sin is not now dismissed by conferring of grace save because grace includes, equivalently or prevalently, in divine acceptation the original innocence that is formally opposed to original sin.

δ. To the Arguments for the Opinion

358. As to the first argument for the preceding opinion [n.347], I concede that cleanness could be made from uncleanness with an opposed cleanness if the original justice that original sin takes away is restored (whether the justice is a gift superadded to nature or is the whole of natural rectitude), that is, if it cuts off the whole deformity of sin.

359. As to the second [n.348], it is plain that the proposition about the opposition of guilt to grace is false; rather the guilt is opposed thus to original justice, and only to grace because grace is equivalent in divine acceptation to original justice. But in no way is the guilt opposed to grace as being properly and precisely the privation of grace.

360. As to the third [n.349], there is a doubt whether guilt is able not to be imputed for punishment if guilt’s disorder is not taken away. But, if it is conceded not thus to be able to, the disorder can be taken away without the conferring of grace.

361. As to the fourth [n.350], I concede that divine offense is placated, and that he whose sin is remitted is reconciled. But it does not follow that ‘therefore he is accepted by God with that special acceptation with which he is accepted through grace’. For man in his pure natural state was in peace with God, but not specially accepted, that is, not worthy of eternal life; for peace and reconciliation only state that God does not wish to avenge the original guilt; but ‘to accept’ states something more, namely ‘to ordain man as worthy of eternal life’ [Ord. I d.17 n.129]. The fact is plain even in our case; for I can be placated by someone who has offended me, so as not to be enemy to him or to wish to avenge what he has done, without receiving him into a special friendship by which he would be ordered to some special good.